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CHAPTER 1 - The pre-Amnesty environment 
 
1.1 Introduction  
From 1 June 2003 to 29 February 2004, qualifying residents with unauthorised 
foreign holdings could apply for exchange control and income tax amnesty 
(hereinafter “the Amnesty’). At first glance the Amnesty appears to be cheap at 
the price. Levies ranged from 2% in the case of domestic tax relief, to 10% for 
applicants who chose not to repatriate foreign assets in excess of certain exchange 
control thresholds. Some applicants did not even have to pay a levy to regularise 
their positions.  
Special rules applied to offshore trusts included in the Amnesty. The importance 
of retaining these structures will be discussed, and a conclusion drawn that 
affected applicants enjoy some unique tax saving opportunities. 
 
Amnesty was seen by some as a golden opportunity to pocket a “get out of jail 
free card1” for contraventions of applicable legislation. An analysis of the true 
cost of the Amnesty, in the context of a changed tax law, will demonstrate that the 
Amnesty was anything but cheap. On the contrary, successful applicants face a 
perpetual future tax cost after Amnesty, and will need to review their tax and 
estate planning initiatives in order to provide for this threat. Some tax planning 
suggestions will be offered, and evaluated in the context of the obvious and 
hidden costs of the Amnesty.  
 
 
                                                 
1 OMG ppt 2 
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1.2 Why was there a need for an offshore tax amnesty? 
 
When the Minister of Finance tabled the Exchange Control Amnesty and 
Amendment of Taxation Laws Bill2 (hereinafter “the Amnesty Act’) on 15 May 
2003,3 he suggested that taxpayers with unauthorised foreign assets, had taken 
cognisance of the government’s achievements in the sphere of global tax 
compliance, and motivated by fear and/or patriotic fervour, many were anxious to 
voluntarily regularise their tax and foreign exchange affairs. 
 
The preamble of the Amnesty Act sets out the objectives of the legislation thus: 
 
a) To enable violators of Exchange Control Regulations and certain tax Acts to 
regularise their affairs in respect of foreign assets attributable to those 
violations; 
 
b) To ensure maximum disclosure of foreign assets and to facilitate repatriation 
thereof  to the Republic; and 
 
c) To extend the tax base by disclosing previously unreported foreign assets.  
 
The Minister’s introductory speech made no mention of the plethora of income 
tax and related regulation that had saturated the legal environment in the years 
immediately preceding the Amnesty. Nor was any reference made to the 
sometimes confusing, and often uncertain, regulations pertaining to offshore 
assets held by residents. Instead, the honourable Minister focussed on illegality 
and criminality.  
 
 
                                                 
2 Act 12 of 2003 
3 Manuel 2 
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It is beyond the scope of this report to examine the motivations for shifting or 
retaining undisclosed funds abroad, but it is important to note that: 
 
a) Considerations of internationally accepted investment prudence, dictate that 
diversification on a global scale minimises the risk of exposure to a single 
emerging economy;  
 
b) Laws that prohibit the free flow of capital, albeit with full income tax 
disclosure, are in themselves of doubtful legitimacy, particularly while 
enacted to protect a minority regime with a “laager” outlook, and with no 
regard to the sensibilities of the global village; and 
 
c) In many instances foreign holdings had already been subjected to foreign 
taxes and death duties, and/or were owned by immigrant residents.  
 
1.3 The tax treatment of foreign holdings before Amnesty. 
 
The Amnesty Act, despite the insinuation contained in the Minister’s introductory 
address, also offered welcome relief to persons who were not tax crooks, but who 
had unwittingly found themselves in technical infringement of complex income 
tax amendments, mostly of far reaching consequence. It is important to examine 
some of the applicable provisions, because it provides an insight into the range of 
transgressions for which Amnesty was applied, and also because in some 
instances these rules still govern the taxability of foreign holdings held by 
residents. 
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1.3.1 Source based taxation 
 
Before January 2001, South Africa applied a source based system of taxation. 
Although “source” is much less important since the change to residence based 
taxation insofar as residents are concerned,4 many applications for amnesty 
extended to transgressions of the Act that occurred before January 2001.  
 
The Act is silent on the definition of the term “source”, and it was not always 
clear whether a taxpayer was obliged to include foreign income in “gross income” 
as required by the Act, or not. The Appellate Division in CIR v Lever Brothers 
Ltd 5 determined that “source” meant “originating cause” and held: 
 
“When the question has to be decided whether or not money received by a 
taxpayer is ‘‘gross income’’ within the meaning of the definition referred to above, 
two problems arise which have not always been differentiated from one another in 
decided cases. The first problem is to determine the source from which it has been 
received and when that has been determined; the second problem is to locate it in 
order to decide whether it is or is not within the Union”6. 
 
Usually, it is fairly simple to determine and locate the “originating cause” of 
income. It is clear from case law that international transactions would be more 
complicated. There are no hard and fast rules, and each case will have to be 
decided on its merits. The court in Lever Brothers supra obiter determined that it 
was even possible for the source of income to be partly in one country, and partly 
in another, but did not offer an equitable basis for dealing with this anomaly. 
                                                 
4 “source” is still relevant in determining the tax liability of non-resident taxpayers (who were excluded from 
applying in terms of the provisions of the Amnesty Act) 
5 1946AD441,14SATC1 
6 Per Watermeyer CJ -  14SATC1 at 8-9 
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1.3.2  Deemed source and other possible infringements 
 
The Income Tax Act also deems, what may, at first glance appear to be foreign 
receipts and accruals in regulated instances, to be from a source within the 
Republic. Tax legislation that may have been infringed by amnesty applicants 
who failed to include foreign deemed and other source income, in gross income in 
relation to their foreign holdings, included:7 
 
a) Section 9C8 – Since 1 July 1997, foreign investment income earned by 
persons ordinarily resident in South Africa, was deemed to be from a 
domestic source; 
 
b) Section 9D – Came into effect from 1 July 1997  and determined the South 
African tax accountability of the income and accruals of Controlled Foreign 
Companies; 
 
c) Sections 9(6) and (7) – Interest earned on certain foreign interest bearing 
arrangements from 1 July 1998 was deemed to be from a local source.9 
 
d) Section 9E – Also, the subject of repeated amendment, this section, since 23 
February 2000, has sought to regulate the taxability of foreign dividends; 
 
e) Section 6 quat – Effective from 1 January 2001, this provision determines the 
rules for claiming foreign tax rebates;10 
                                                 
7 The list of possible infringements was in part compiled from notes taken at the  Divaris  pre-amnesty 
workshop; 
8 Repealed by s. 9 of Act No. 59 of 2000 
9 provided such income did not qualify for an exemption in terms of Sections 10(1)(h) and 10(1)(hA) RS 9, 
2004  JUTA'S INCOME TAX 9(3)-(7) 
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f) Section 7(8)11 – an anti avoidance provision that deems income diverted by a 
resident to a non resident to accrue to the former – effective 1 January 2001.12  
 
g) Section 9F(3)13 – regulated the timing of foreign accruals not immediately 
able to be remitted to the Republic – effective 1 January 2001; 
 
h) Section 10(1)(kA) – read with Section 9F(1) and (2) dealt with the qualifying 
criteria for the tax exemption of foreign income received or accrued from 
specified foreign jurisdictions – effective 1 January 2001.  
 
i) Section 25D - regulates the method of taxation in ZAR of income received or 
accrued in a foreign currency – effective 1 January 2001. These rules are 
complicated and have been repeatedly amended14; 
 
Deeming provisions by their very nature, seek to create a fiction, “a state of 
affairs that doesn’t really exist.15 Coupled with the genius of modern international 
financial engineering, and the use of derivative and hybrid instruments, it is small 
wonder then, that it was not always black or white whether foreign receipts and 
accruals were to be included in the gross income of a taxpayer or not. – Perhaps 
this is the origin of the expression “Grey Money Amnesty”?  
 
 
                                                                                                                                     
10 Foreign tax rebates may only be claimed for taxes paid on foreign sourced income, and not taxes paid on 
income that is from a deemed local source. This can lead to severe tax hardship – see later at 4..3.2.3; 
11 The forerunner of this section was s. 9D(4) 
12 This is most relevant to applicants who made donations to offshore trusts; 
13 Repealed by s. 24 (1) of the Revenue Laws Amendment Act 45 of 2003. 
14 The rules (recently amended again in 2003) depend upon a variety of factors, including whether receipts 
and expenditure incurred are attributable to a permanent establishment outside the Republic. 
15 Professor Michael Katz at the Sanlam seminar; 
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1.3.3 Residence based taxation 
 
Any doubt as to whether or not foreign receipts and accruals, deemed or 
otherwise, had an “originating cause” in the Republic and were generally 
therefore taxable, was largely removed, when South Africa changed from a 
“source based” system, to a “residence based” system of taxation,16with effect 
from 1 January 2001.17 In terms hereof, residents (as defined18) are accountable to 
the Commissioner for worldwide receipts and accruals,19 irrespective of their 
originating cause. The 2000 Budget Review20 confirmed that the change from 
“source based” taxation to “residence based” taxation would have the effect of: 
 
“[broadening] the South African tax base, [limiting] opportunities for tax arbitrage, 
and [bringing] the tax system into line with generally accepted norms for taxing 
international transactions.”21  
 
The last decade has been characterised by a gradual relaxation of exchange 
control regulations. The change to residence taxation is a natural corollary of this 
relaxation, because it deters taxpayers from “exporting” their income tax liability 
abroad to the detriment of the fiscus. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
16 See 2000 AS 813 at 813 where Professor Julia Boltar explains how the change from source to residence 
was achieved by amending the definition of “gross income” in s1 of the Act. 
17 Applicable to years of assessment commencing after this date 
18 The definition of “resident” was inserted into s1 of the Act by s 2 (h) of Act 59 of 2000 and amended by s. 
33 (1) of Act 12 of 2003. 
19 Subject to certain exemptions eg foreign pensions and certain income earned abroad with qualifying 
absence from SA. 
20 Silke  at 5-3 
21 At 22 of the Review 
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1.3.3.1 The meaning of ‘resident” 
 
It is important to define the term, both because of the change to residence based 
taxation, and because “residence” was one of the compulsory tax amnesty 
application qualifying criteria. The Act defines a resident as a natural person who 
is “ordinarily resident” in the Republic, or a natural person who was “physically 
present” in the Republic for regulated periods.22 Residence is generally triggered 
for non-natural person taxpayers by “place of effective management.23”  
 
Statute does not offer a clear definition of “ordinarily resident”, but at common 
law this means:  
 
“(The) country to which he would naturally and as a matter of course return from 
his wanderings; as contrasted with other lands it might be called his usual or 
principal residence.[It] would be described more aptly than other countries as his 
real home”24   
 
The taxpayer bears the onus of proving that he/she is not “ordinarily resident” in 
the Republic, and yet no clearer definition of the term exists. Uninterrupted 
physical presence is not a requirement. Internationally, the courts have developed 
a variety of tests,25and SARS itself issued an Income Tax Interpretation Note26  
                                                 
22 Natural persons physically present in the Republic, for a period(s) exceeding 91 days in aggregate during 
the relevant year of assessment, as well as for a period or periods exceeding 91 days in aggregate during 
each of the three years of assessment preceding such year of assessment; and for a period or periods 
exceeding 549 days in aggregate during such three preceding years of assessment, are deemed to be 
resident with effect from the first day of that relevant year of assessment: 
23 A quirk of this definition is that it is possible for a non-natural person to be resident in two jurisdictions, eg 
where a foreign jurisdiction (with whom no double taxation agreement exists) applies a different criterion. 
24  Per Schreiner JA in Cohen v CIR 1946 AD 174 at 185 as cited by CIR v Kuttel 1992 (3) SA 2423 (A), 54 
SATC 298, See also ITC 1501 53 SATC 314. 
25 eg the leading Canadian case of Thompson v Minister of National Revenue 2 DTC (SCC) where it was 
held that a person is ordinarily resident in the place 'where in the settled routine of his life he regularly 
normally and customarily lives' or 'at which he in mind and in facts settles into or maintains or centralises 
his ordinary mode of living with its accessories in social relations, interest and conveniences.' In the 
English case Shah v Barnet London Borough Council and Other Appeals 1983 1 ALL ER 226 (HL) 234b- 
c it was held that to be ordinarily resident in a specific country 'a person must be habitually and normally 
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setting out a non exhaustive list of factors to be taken into account. JUTA'S 
INCOME TAX27 points out that the existence of the note itself makes it “clear that 
no hard and fast rules can be laid down”, and that each case will have to be 
decided on its own merits 
 
While intention is relevant to “ordinary residence,” this is not so with the statutory 
physical presence test set out in statute.28 As soon as a natural person has satisfied 
all three tests of physical presence, he/she becomes resident for purposes of the 
Act.29 A person can be ordinarily resident in two jurisdictions.30 It is even 
possible to be ordinarily resident in the Republic despite being absent throughout 
the entire year of assessment.31 To add to the apparent confusion, “resident” has a 
different meaning for exchange control purposes, and refers to a person who has 
taken up residence or is domiciled in the Republic.32  
 
1.3.3.2 Residence based taxation and foreign holdings 
 
 
The change to residence based taxation had largely achieved its intended effect. 
The South African tax net had been widened with the flick of the legislators’ pen. 
The dilemma now facing residents with undisclosed foreign assets, was how to 
make disclosure to the Commissioner, under the new residence based system of 
taxation, inter alia in circumstances where: 
                                                                                                                                     
resident [t]here, apart from temporary or occasional absences of long or short duration.' (both as cited by 
RS 6, 2002 JUTA'S INCOME TAX  - 1 representative taxpayer-2 under the interpretation of “resident”) 
26 3 of 2002 
27 RS 6, 2002 JUTA'S INCOME TAX  - 1 representative taxpayer-2 under the interpretation of “resident” 
28 s.1 defines “resident” and makes no reference to the reason for the presence; 
29 Residence is triggered from the first day of the year of assessment in which all three criteria are satisfied. 
30 Silke at 14-42 
31 ibid 30 
32 See (b) under the definition of “resident” in Section 1 of the Amnesty Act 
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a) There was non compliance with the Act, especially after the inclusion of 
passive foreign investment income on 1 July 1997; and/or  
 
b) Exchange Control Regulations had been contravened; and/or   
 
c) Disclosure of foreign income, might expose other infringements of the Act, eg 
where a donation of the foreign holding had been made to an “offshore trust,” 
and donations and other taxes had not been accounted for; or  
 
d) Undisclosed domestic income had been shifted/retained abroad; or 
 
e) “Whistle blowing legislation” imposed reporting obligations on accountable 
institutions,33 and wide definitions of “unlawful activities” might lead to asset 
forfeiture and draconian sanctions; 
 
Surely, if the price was right, many facing these predicaments, would jump at an 
opportunity to regularise their tax and foreign exchange positions? 
 
1.3.4 Capital Gains Tax  
 
Hard on the heels of residence based taxation, was Capital Gains Tax (“CGT”), 
which was introduced into the South African tax system with effect from 1 
October 200134. This was achieved with the insertion of a new Section 26A and a 
new Eighth Schedule to the Income Tax Act.35 
 
                                                 
33 cf s.29 of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 of 2001 
34 By way of the Taxation Laws Amendment Act 5 of 2001 
35 2001AS 808 
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Section 26A provides: 
 
               "There shall be included in the taxable income of a person for a year of assessment 
the taxable capital gain of that person for that year of assessment, as determined 
in terms of the Eighth Schedule.” 
 
The definition of “taxable income” was also amended to include: 
 
“All amounts to be included or deemed to be included in the taxable income of any 
person in terms of this Act". 
 
The 2001 Annual Survey of South African Law36, suggests that the original 
legislation was “introduced hastily and without proper consideration of the precise 
wording and consequences of each provision. 
[Difficulties] continue[d] to arise when [interpreting] the amended Eighth 
Schedule”, notwithstanding two further attempts by the legislator in the same year 
to clarify the position.37 
 
It is respectfully contended that the 8th Schedule is a further example of the less 
than clearly drafted tax legislation prevailing immediately prior to Amnesty. 
South African taxpayers, applying a residence based system of taxation, were now 
accountable to the Commissioner for capital gains made on the disposal of assets 
not only in South Africa, but also abroad. As will be discussed later, the 
introduction of CGT, also has considerable ramifications for amnesty applicants, 
and amounts to a “hidden cost” of a successful application. 
 
 
 
                                                 
36 At 808 
37 Revenue Laws Amendment Acts 19 and 60 of 2001 
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1.4 Who could apply for tax amnesty? 
 
Natural persons, a deceased estate, a close corporation or a trust, that were 
resident in South Africa for tax purposes,38 were able to apply for domestic tax 
amnesty for contraventions of the Estate Duty and Income Tax Acts, arising from 
unauthorised foreign assets held on 28 February 2003. The effective date of the 
tax amnesty was 28 February 2002.39 Companies, except under limited 
circumstances,40 were not able to apply for amnesty. Amnesty was also available 
to qualifying persons (facilitators) who assisted (other than solely in an advisory 
capacity) applicants to accumulate foreign assets; or to transfer funds or assets out 
of the Republic. 
 
An application for tax amnesty could not be made where the foreign holding: 
  
a) related to an amount withheld or deducted from an employee in terms of 
Paragraph 2 of the Fourth Schedule to the Income Tax Act41; or  
 
b) related to an amount of withholding tax payable on royalties in terms of 
Section 35 of the Income Tax Act42;   
 
Provision was also made for amnesty, if granted, to be revoked, if it transpired 
that a portion of the foreign holding was “wholly or partly” derived from the 
proceeds of any unlawful activity.43 “Unlawful activity” means an  
                                                 
38 Residence for exchange control purposes was required in order to apply for exchange control amnesty. 
39 s. 15 of the Amnesty Act. The effective date of the exchange control amnesty was 28 February 2003 
40 a company was only able to apply when all the shares were held by a natural person applicant or his 
relatives, or a family trust. A company could also apply for relief as a facilitator. 
41 s.3(2)(a) of the Amnesty Act 
42 s.3(2)(b) of the Amnesty Act 
43 s. 20(1)(b) of the Amnesty Act 
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activity defined as such in the Prevention of Organised Crime Act (hereinafter 
“POCA”).44 The courts have recognised the need to interpret POCA 
restrictively,45 but that Act patently extends the definition of an “unlawful 
activity” to include any contravention of the Vat Act.46 
 
Public policy demanded that amnesty could not be granted where, before 
submission of the application, the applicant had received notice of an audit, 
investigation or other enforcement action relating to a contravention for which 
amnesty was sought.47 
 
CHAPTER 2 - Offshore trusts 
 
2.1 Background 
 
 
Trusts date back to medieval times when wealthy knights, about to depart on the 
Crusades, entrusted their assets to a third party (usually a competent senior 
relative), to be administered for the benefit of their dependants while away 
waging war, or in the event of death.48 Broadly speaking, a trustee stands in the 
shoes of both the creator of the trust (usually referred to as “the founder”), and the 
persons for whose benefit the trust was created (the “beneficiaries.”) 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
44 Act 121 of 1998 
45 National Director of Public Prosecutions v Seevnarayan 2003 (2) SA 178 (C) 
46 Act 89 of 1991 
47 s 10(1)(b) of the Amnesty Act; 
48 “ FTC brochure at page 3 
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2.2 General legal principles pertaining to trusts 
 
Generally, at law a trust does not enjoy separate legal personality, although our 
law does recognise that ownership of property disposed of to a trust, vests in the 
trustees of that trust and no longer in the hands of the disposer. Trusts were 
initially omitted from the statutory definition of “persons.” Section 1 of the Act 
was later amended to extend the definition of “person” to include “any trust”, and 
accordingly a trust is liable for taxation as a separate taxpayer. Before this 
amendment, our courts recognised that income derived from trust assets was 
received by, or accrued to the trustees,49 and not to the founder or beneficiaries. 
 
SA residents with foreign assets might have donated their wealth to offshore 
trusts, as founder/settler, and together with their families, be a beneficiary. If the 
donation was made by the taxpayer before becoming ordinarily resident in SA,50 
or the foreign asset donated (or a replacement thereof51) was inherited52 from a 
person who at time of death was not ordinarily resident in SA, or the foreign asset 
was accumulated from a trade carried on outside SA,53 then the donor would not 
be liable for donations tax. If however, the donation was made by the founder 
when ordinarily resident in SA, and the donation of the foreign asset did not 
qualify for a recognised exemption, the taxpayer would be liable for donations 
tax, in some cases as much as 25%.54 
                                                 
49 Thorne and Molenaar NNO v Receiver of Revenue Cape Town 1976(2)SA50(C), 38 SATC 1 at SATC 6; 
see also CIR v Friedman and others NNO 1993(1)SA 353 (A), 55 SATC 39 and Silke  12- 24-1 and 2 
50 s 56(1)(g)(i) of the Act 
51 s 56(1)(g)(iii) of the Act 
52 s 56(1)(g)(ii) of the Act 
53 s 56(1)(g)(iv) of the Act;  
54 s 54 of the Act  
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2.3 Tax advantages of a trust 
 
Rules that impute what may otherwise appear to be receipts and accruals in the 
name of the trust to the founder and beneficiaries exist by way of exception. 
These exceptions are statutorily codified in Sections 25B and Section 11(1)(d) of 
the 8th Schedule of the Act (‘the vesting provisions”), which read with related 
provisions, transfer the liability for taxation to the beneficiaries of the trust. The 
anti-avoidance provisions of the Act seek to impute liability to the founder/ donor.  
 
The “vesting provisions” transfer liability for taxation to resident beneficiaries 
who have acquired a vested interest to income or capital earned by the trust, either 
in terms of the provisions of the trust deed, or because the trustees have exercised 
their discretion to make an award to a beneficiary.55  
 
Distribution of previously unvested trust assets will give rise to a CGT disposal56. 
 
“[Until then], there can be no accrual of any ascertainable amount of income to the 
beneficiaries….[As] soon as the trustee exercises his discretion, the contingent 
right of a beneficiary becomes a vested one, and he is liable to tax on the income 
distributed to him57”  
 
Relinquishment of control over the trust assets by the founder is a key ingredient 
in the enquiry as to whether the trust is of an arm’s length nature or not, or 
whether the trust is an alter ego of the founder. The deed of a discretionary trust 
typically contains the hallmarks of unfettered discretion, and confers on the 
trustees, complete freedom to distribute the income and capital of the trust to  
                                                 
55 whether or not this had been distributed to such beneficiary or not; 
56 paragraph 13(1)(d) of the 8th Schedule of the Act; 
57 Silke 12.1.5 “Trusts – General principles” 
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beneficiaries whenever, and in whatever percentage they deem appropriate. The 
trustees are authorised to make distributions to the exclusion of beneficiaries, and 
may even donate the entire trust fund to a charitable institution.58 The founder in 
fact “trusts” the party managing the trust to adhere to “instructions” that are 
carefully framed as a “Letter of Wishes” to refute the contention that the founder 
still exercises control over the trust property. 
 
2.4 Tax arbitrage and offshore trusts 
 
Tax arbitrages may arise where the trust is liable, if at all, for taxation in a foreign 
jurisdiction. Rates of taxation can be dramatically dissimilar. Some countries have 
CGT while others do not. Jurisdictional definitions differ,59 as might the 
interpretation of “look through rules.”60 If SA tax jurisdictional requirements do 
not create a basis to tax the offshore trust, the lower or zero rate of taxation where 
the trust is liable for taxation, will reduce wealth erosion through taxation to the 
extent of the saving. 
 
Section 25B (2A) of the Act is a statutory measure fashioned by the legislature to 
address tax arbitrage, and the loss of revenue to the fiscus. It provides that if a 
resident acquires a vested or contingent right to capital of a non resident trust, and 
such capital arose from income received by or accrued to such trust, which would 
have constituted income if such trust had been a resident of South Africa, such 
amount shall be included in the income of the resident. 
                                                 
58 See for example FTC and Guinness Flight standard trust deeds 
59 This can even lead to dual residence; 
60 Such as Controlled Foreign Company and Permanent Establishment definitions; 
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2.5 Anti – avoidance measures. 
 
2.5.1 General propositions 
 
The cornerstone judicial statement on tax avoidance,61can be found in the words 
of Justice Learned Hand who said: 
 
“[There] is nothing sinister in so arranging one’s affairs as to keep taxes as low as 
possible. Everybody does so, rich or poor, and all do right, for nobody owes any 
public duty to pay more than the law demands; taxes are enforced exactions, not 
voluntary contributions. To demand more in the name of morals is mere cant” 
 
The distinction between that which constitutes a legitimate arrangement of one’s 
tax affairs, and that conduct which constitutes tax evasion, is often represented by 
a fine line. There are many common law examples where the courts have applied 
a substance over form test, opting to classify the taxability of the arrangement as 
to its substance, rather than its form. Melamet J, President of the Special Court for 
Hearing Income Tax Appeals, succinctly set out the position when he said: 
 
“ Dit is ‘n bekende beginsel in die inkomstebelastingreg dat die klem gele word op 
die substansie van die transaksie en nie die regsvorm waarin dit geklee is nie62” 
 
2.5.2 Statutory anti-avoidance provisions and offshore trusts 
 
Section 103 of the Act is a general statutory anti avoidance provision, inserted 
into law to counter-act schemes designed to escape tax liability, whether such 
schemes were entered into before or after the commencement of the section.63  
                                                 
61 A minority opinion in Silke 19 -3 from the case Commissioner v Newman at 159 F 2d 848(CCA-2 1947) 
62 ITC 1518 (1989)54 SATC 113 at 131 the learned judge cited SIR v Sidley 1977(4)SA913(A),39 SATC 153 
at 159-60 both as cited by Silke at 19-3 footnote 4c 
63 s 103(3) of the Act 
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Section 7 of the Act targets a range of instances that might otherwise result in a 
reduction of tax for donors and disposers. Sections 7(5) and 7(8) and 25B 
specifically attribute income earned by a trust to the disposer under applicable 
circumstances, and Paragraphs 70, 72 and 80 of the Eighth Schedule, contain 
similar capital gains tax related provisions. Donations that are disguised as loans 
are regarded as disposals for the purposes of the anti-avoidance measures.64  
 
The anti avoidance provisions posed a tax hazard to persons who had donated 
(previously undisclosed) offshore assets to trusts, and where neither the donation 
nor receipts and accruals earned in the name of the trust, had been accounted for. 
 
2.6 Estate planning advantages of a trust 
 
Trusts, by their nature, are able to survive the founder. Assets housed in a trust do 
not form part of the planner’s deceased estate, and are not subject to estate duty. 
Growth on trust property takes place within the trust, and not in the estate of the 
founder, and as such will be exempt from estate duty. This gives rise to an estate 
planning technique called “pegging the value of the estate,” because the value of 
the asset for deceased estate account purposes is limited to the value of the asset 
at the time it is transferred to the trust. This transfer/ disposal is often structured in 
the form of a sale of the asset, with the seller receiving a credit loan account in the 
books of the trust for the amount of the purchase price outstanding. Where the 
deceased is a creditor of a trust, the amount of this indebtedness is an asset in the 
deceased estate, and will have to be brought into account for estate duty purposes. 
                                                 
64 See Ovenstone v SIR 1980(2) SA 721 (A), 42SATC 55; See also CIR v Berold 1962(3) SA 748(A), 
24SATC 729 at 735-6 all as cited by Silke at 10.64 and 5 and especially footnote 97.  
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As will be discussed later, the choice by amnesty applicants to deem offshore trust 
assets to be their own property under applicable circumstances, impacts on the 
resident’s income tax affairs, without disturbing the estate planning advantages of 
retaining the trust. 
 
2.7 Non-tax related advantages of a trust 
 
Trusts also became popular for a variety of non taxation reasons.65 They are 
pursued to preserve wealth for future generations, and offer anonymity66and 
protection against unsuitable matrimonial unions and creditor claims. 
  
2.8 Section 4 of the Amnesty Act – “Taxing the Golden Egg”67 
 
Amnesty applicants were generally wealthy, sophisticated, and tax averse. An 
amnesty that did not extend to offshore trusts would have been a waste of time. 
Section 468 of the Amnesty Act contains special rules for applicants, who had 
donated foreign assets to, or were beneficiaries of, non resident discretionary 
trusts. In terms hereof, applicants could elect to deem offshore trust property to be 
their own assets for income tax and exchange control purposes. This is a dramatic 
statutory provision, and represents the source of some golden tax planning 
opportunities. It also has the potential to cause a deep level shaft collapse. An 
election as contemplated by the section, can, in the absence of effective tax 
planning, also lead to an erosion of previously undisclosed foreign nest eggs, now 
the target of residence based taxation in South Africa.  
                                                 
65 FTC brochure – page 4 
66 In certain foreign jurisdictions (eg Guernsey), there is no requirement that the trust deed be publicly filed. 
67 Investec legal department pre- amnesty seminar held at the end of December 2003; 
68 s 4 of the Amnesty Act was the topic of much controversy and was amended several times. 
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2.8.1 Section 4 qualification criteria 
 
Applicants, who wished to avail themselves of the deeming provision in Section 
4, had to satisfy the following requirements: 
 
a) The applicant had to be a donor or a beneficiary of the offshore trust; and 
 
b) The trust69 had to be discretionary;70 and 
 
c) The trust had to be non resident71; and 
 
d) At least part of the offshore trust property had to have been donated by the 
applicant; 72 and  
 
e) At least part of the trust property must have been wholly or partly derived 
from assets held in contravention of exchange controls, or not have been 
disclosed to the Commissioner73; and 
 
f) The asset must have been held by the trust on 28 February 2003; and 
 
g) The asset must not have vested in a beneficiary of the trust;74 
 
 
                                                 
69 It is doubtful whether the Lichtenstein creations of the Anstalt (Establishment) and Stiftung (Foundation) 
would  qualify as a “trust” as envisaged by s.4 – see Spitz – page 4 and 5supra 
70 No definition is offered by the Amnesty Act; 
71 This poses particular problems where the “effective place of management” of the trust (and therefore its 
residence) might be construed to be in South Africa, if correspondence was accepted at one branch of a 
South African institution, and couriered overnight to a foreign branch office of that same institution.  
72 s 4 (2)(a) of the Amnesty Act. “Donation” included a deemed donation as contemplated in s 58 of the 
Income Tax Act and also extended to authorised assets housed in an offshore trust together with 
unauthorised assets donated to the trust. 
73 s 4(2)(b) of the Amnesty Act 
74 Although s 4 would not apply, if the asset had vested, the beneficiary might have been able to apply in their 
own right as an applicant  
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2.8.2 The effect of the election in terms of Section 4 
 
Provided all the above criteria were satisfied, the election75 would mean that the 
applicant was deemed to have held the foreign asset,  
 
a) for the purposes of the Exchange Control Amnesty from the date of 
acquisition of that asset by the offshore trust;76 and 
 
b) for the purposes of the Income Tax Act,77, from the first day of the last year of 
assessment ending on or before 28 February 2003,78 
 
until disposal by the trust,79death of the donor,80 the applicant ceased to be a 
resident,81or the deceased estate, close corporation or trust ceases to exist in law,82 
in which event: 
 
a) The applicant was deemed to have acquired the foreign asset for an amount 
equal to the sum of its market value on 1 March 2002, and any subsequent 
expenditure incurred by that discretionary trust in respect of that foreign 
asset83; and 
 
b) The applicant was free to deal with the foreign asset in the same manner as it 
could be dealt with by that discretionary trust from 28 February 2003;84 and 
                                                 
75 s.4 of the Amnesty regulations deemed the election to have been made on 28 February 2003. 
76 S 4(3)(a)(i) of the Amnesty Act 
77 Other than Parts V and VII and Chapter II of the Income Tax Act; 
78 S 4(3)(a)(ii) of the Amnesty Act – for natural person taxpayers this means since 1March 2002. 
79 S 4(c)(i) of the Amnesty Regulations issued in terms of s 30 of the Amnesty Act; 
80 S 4(c)(ii) of the Regulations; 
81 S 4(c)(ii) of the Regulations; 
82 S 4(c)(iii) of the Regulations; 
83 S 4(a) of the Regulations; 
84 S 4(b) of the Regulations; 
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c) Any income received or accrued, or expenditure incurred by the offshore trust 
after 1 March 2002, would be deemed to have been received or accrued or 
incurred, during the period that the foreign asset was so deemed to be held by 
the applicant;85 
 
CHAPTER 3 -The scope of the Amnesty 
 
3.1 Included in the Tax Amnesty. 
 
In exchange for the payment of a domestic tax levy of a mere 2%,86 calculated 
with reference to the amount of the previously undisclosed transaction against 
which domestic tax relief was sought, a successful applicant would receive:  
 
a) Exemption from tax on undeclared foreign income until 28 February 2002;87 
 
b) Exemption, where applicable, from donations tax, STC, estate duty and 
income tax on undeclared amounts arising in the Republic, and shifted and/or 
accumulated offshore, until 28 February 2002.88 
 
c) Exemption from penalties and interest on taxes until 28 February 2002.89 
 
d) Immunity from criminality and prosecution for disclosed offences committed 
in terms of relevant tax and estate duty legislation until 28 February 2002.90 
                                                 
85 s. 4(h) of the Regulations; 
86 s 16 of the Amnesty Act 
87 s 15 of the Amnesty Act 
88 ss 17(1) and (3) of the Amnesty Act 
89 s 17(1) of the Amnesty Act  – “shall not be liable for the payment of any tax or duty…” 
90 s.17(1) 
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In all cases, an applicant did not enjoy tax (or exchange control) amnesty in 
respect of undisclosed foreign funds. 
 
3.2 Excluded from the tax amnesty  
 
Much like social mores dictated that Vat and PAYE transgressions were 
unpardonable, and gave rise to disqualifying amnesty qualification criteria, 
considerations of public policy, required that tax relief did not extend to: 
 
a) A credit for taxes already paid in respect of unauthorised assets;91and 
 
b) Taxes that may be payable, or become payable, by an applicant in 
consequence of any return or information furnished to the Commissioner by 
that applicant before the date of the amnesty application.92 
 
c) A credit for deductions/allowances/losses or rebates relating to any amount in 
respect of which tax amnesty was granted.93 
 
3.3 Reserve Bank Circular D405 
 
3.3.1 Foreign inheritances and immigrant funds 
 
Immigrants to the Republic, who wished to leave funds abroad, are required to 
make a declaration to an authorised dealer, and provide an undertaking that they 
would not place these foreign funds at the disposal of a South African resident.94  
                                                 
91 s 18(a) of the Amnesty Act 
92 s 18(b) of the Amnesty Act 
93 ss 19(a) and (b) of the Amnesty Act 
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Residents,95who wished to retain foreign inheritances received before 17 March 
1997 abroad, are required to make a similar declaration.96 Foreign inheritances 
received after that date, were not required to be reported to the authorities, and 
could be retained abroad as part of the resident’s foreign capital allowance. 
Accordingly there was no need to apply for exchange control amnesty in respect 
of such a foreign inheritance.  
 
Natural persons, who earned foreign income abroad before 1 July 1997, were 
required to repatriate such income to the Republic.97  
 
Contravention of these regulations is an offence falling within the scope of the 
exchange control portion of the amnesty, and therefore initially curable via the 
payment of an exchange control levy. In all cases, “deemed source,” and later 
“residence based taxation,” meant that receipts and accruals attaching to foreign 
inheritances (whether received before or after 17 March 1998), and to immigrant 
funds legally or illegally retained abroad, had to be brought into account for tax 
purposes by South African resident taxpayers. 
 
Where a taxpayer had not accounted to the Commissioner for receipts and 
accruals relating to such funds, and/or donated these holdings (to an offshore 
trust) without paying donations tax, an application for domestic tax relief would 
be required to regularise the tax position up to 28 February 2002. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                     
94 s C.2(F) of the Exchange Control Rulings 
95 For exchange control purposes 
96 Regulations 6 and 7 of the Exchange Control Regulations 
97 Exchange Control Regulation 6 
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When the Amnesty was announced, there was widespread consternation from 
immigrants and persons who had retained undisclosed foreign inheritances 
received before 17 March 1998 abroad. These persons were vehemently opposed 
to paying exchange control levies of up to 10% to regularise their foreign 
holdings, particularly because, the funds had mostly already been taxed in the 
foreign jurisdiction, and/or been subjected to foreign estate duties. Furthermore, 
inheritances received after that date did not require disclosure and could be 
retained abroad without the payment of an exchange control levy. 
 
The authorities recognised that a substantial number of taxpayers would “escape” 
the amnesty net, and feared damage to the integrity of the process and a loss of 
revenue. In a welcome albeit regrettably belated step, SARB published Reserve 
Bank Circular D40598 containing an “administrative concession.”99 The Circular 
enabled immigrants and heirs of foreign deceased estates who had infringed 
exchange control regulations, to make a declaration to an authorised dealer, and in 
so doing receive amnesty without having to pay an exchange control levy.  
 
The Circular made it clear however, that the Reserve Bank concession did not 
extend to transgressions of the Income Tax or Estate Duty Acts, and a separate 
application for tax amnesty would still have to be submitted to the Amnesty Unit, 
if applicable. 
 
 
                                                 
98 Circular D405 was included into the Amnesty Act by item 2 of the Schedule to the Regulations 
promulgated in terms of s 30 of the Amnesty Act.  
99 Circular D405 1 supra 
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3.3.2 Unauthorised foreign loans 
 
South African residents100 are not, without special Reserve Bank authorisation, 
permitted to make use of gearing when structuring their foreign investments.  
 
The last decade has been characterised by a boom in the international property 
market, and it became increasingly popular for South African husbands and 
wives,101 each using their foreign capital allowance of R750 000, to combine their 
resources to place a deposit on a property with a greater value. A loan would then 
be raised from a foreign lending institution for the balance of the purchase price 
by using the property as collateral. Rental income would typically fund the 
mortgage bond instalments at competitive interest rates.  
 
This is a commonly used property investment mechanism, but the Exchange 
Control Regulations specifically outlaw the raising of foreign loans,102 and 
accordingly such borrowers were in infringement of the law. 
 
Reserve Bank Circular D405 offered persons who had raised foreign loans to 
regularise their positions by making a declaration to an Authorised Dealer before 
the expiry of the Amnesty deadline.103 The Circular contained a further concession 
inasmuch as the amount of the loan could be subtracted from the value of the 
unauthorised foreign asset, in order to calculate the exchange control levy.  
                                                 
100 For Exchange Control purposes 
101 Also tax payers in good standing, who had been granted the R750 000 foreign capital allowance combined 
funds to act in a syndicate. 
102 Whether for property or otherwise 
103 29 February 2004 
 33
 
 
Although this declaration would regularise the exchange control infringement, it 
did not for example, exonerate any failure to account for income earned on the 
geared asset eg rental income, and this would have to form part of a separate 
application for tax amnesty.  
 
Sadly, the provisions of Sections 19(a) and (b) of the Amnesty Act specifically 
deny applicants the right to claim a deduction for interest paid to the lender, 
although this is an expense incurred in the production of (rental) income104. 
 
3.3.3 74/26 Structures 
 
Acting often on professional advice, certain natural person residents set up 74/26 
structures. In terms of this construction, the investor would directly or indirectly105 
acquire a substantial shareholding of a non resident company. Non-resident Co 
would in turn, acquire a majority shareholding in Resident Co (74%), and the 
investor and/or his family would hold the balance (26%). The investor would then 
sell certain selected growth assets to the Resident Co, and receive a credit loan 
account in respect of the purchase price outstanding from time to time. 
 
The transfer of the growth assets to Resident Co was pursued in the hope of 
achieving similar estate planning advantages discussed at 2.6 supra, but with the 
added advantage, that capital distributions from Resident Co could prima facie be 
legitimately exported to the foreign shareholder. These distributions in turn, could 
then be further invested to grow “outside” the estate of the investor, all without  
                                                 
104 See 3.2(c) supra 
105 Usually via a non resident discretionary trust 
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appearing to contravene Exchange Control Regulations. The legitimacy of this 
structure was always the subject of much debate. Reserve Bank Circular 
D405106for the first time, issued a pronouncement on 74/26 schemes, and declared 
such structures to be in contravention of Regulation 10(1)(c).107  
 
Applicants willing to make the required disclosures would be given an 
administrative type nolle prosequi, but were required to unwind the structure and; 
 
a) Acquire into their own names, the shares in Resident Co (previously held by 
Non-resident Co) at historic cost, before the expiry of the Amnesty;108 and 
 
b) Either repatriate funds exported by Resident Co to Non-resident Co, together 
with any growth thereon, within 90 days of the expiry of the Amnesty, in 
exchange for the payment of a 5% exchange control levy;109 or retain such 
funds abroad, in exchange for disclosure to an Authorised Dealer, and 
payment of a 10% levy within the same time period. 
 
Unlike other exchange control levies payable in terms of the Amnesty, levies 
emanating from “74/26 structures” would be reduced by a “Transaction 
Recoupment.” This recoupment, would comprise the amount of tax and/or or duty 
levied in terms of the Income Tax Act, the Stamp Duties Act110 and/or the 
Transfer Duty Act111 payable by the resident in consequence of having to make the  
                                                 
106 At page 3 supra 
107 Of the Exchange Control Regulations 
108 At 5.2.1 
109 Circular D405 at 5.2.2 
110 Act No 77of 1968; 
111 Act No 40 of 1949; 
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disposals necessary to unwind the structure and/or to repatriate the funds.112 
Applicants have three years from the expiry of the Amnesty to provide 
documentary evidence of taxes and duties paid, failing which they will lose the 
right to claim the recoupment. The recoupment may not exceed the amount of the 
exchange control levy paid, and applicants will receive no interest on amounts 
held by SARB before repayment.113 
  
It is noteworthy that amnesty applicants are otherwise precluded from claiming 
any levy reduction for taxes incurred as a result of disposals required to fund 
levies and/or repatriation. Is this because 74/26 schemes are less unlawful? 
 
CHAPTER 4 – The true cost of Amnesty 
 
 4.1 Unbelievably cheap at the price? 
 
Initially, a strict interpretation of the Amnesty Act required an applicant applying 
for domestic tax relief, to pay a levy of 2% on the value of each and every taxable 
event previously undisclosed to the Commissioner. Later the statute was amended 
to require the levy to be paid only once.114  
 
This was a gigantic concession for taxpayers with undisclosed domestic income 
that had been shifted offshore, and who had also donated such funds to an 
offshore trust, without paying donations tax. Further income might have been 
received or accrued on investments pursued, and not disclosed to the  
                                                 
112 For example Capital Gains Tax 
113 Circular D405 at 6.3  
114 Regulation 16 promulgated in terms of s 30 of the Amnesty Act. 
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Commissioner. Despite at least three sets of transgressions, the taxpayer was able 
to receive amnesty by paying the 2% domestic tax levy out of local resources only 
once, and legally retain the assets abroad in the offshore trust.115It is not 
surprising then, that many jumped at the opportunity to regularise their tax 
positions, at a cost that must anger law abiding taxpayers, who paid average rates 
of tax approaching 38.5%, and who had adhered to the letter of Exchange Control 
Regulations. The constitutional implications of this concession if and when tested, 
will make for some interesting legal debate.  
 
4.2 The obvious costs of Amnesty 
 
The obvious costs of amnesty (where applicable) are: 
 
a) The two percent domestic tax levy, payable once on the amounts previously 
not disclosed to the Commissioner;116 
 
b) An exchange control levy of ten percent of undisclosed foreign assets held on 
28 February 2003 in excess of the applicant’s normal offshore allowance;117 
 
c) An exchange control levy (if applicable) of five percent calculated with 
reference to the value of funds repatriated that were in excess of the 
applicant’s foreign investment allowance as at 28 February 2003;118 
 
Not too onerous? – Well…. “Come into my parlour”…. said the spider to the fly! 
                                                 
115 Facilitators too were only required to pay the domestic tax levy once, and where an applicant for domestic 
tax relief was also a facilitator, the domestic tax levy of 2% was also only payable once (regulation 16) 
116 s 16 of the Amnesty Act. 
117 s 12 of the Amnesty Act; 
118 s 12 of the Amnesty Act; 
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4.3 The Hidden Costs of Amnesty 
 
4.3.1  Hidden Cost 1 – an increase in tax through progressive taxation 
 
Tax amnesty was granted until 28 February 2002. Natural person applicants were 
required to regularise their income tax positions from 1 March 2002, and to 
include worldwide receipts and accruals into their tax returns as part of the 
“residence based system of taxation.”119   
 
The following illustrations show just how expensive the inclusion of previously 
undisclosed income can become: 
 
Illustration 1 – The taxability of previously undisclosed income: 
 
 Onshore (in isolation) Offshore (in isolation) 
Taxable income R600 000 R300 000 
Tax payable120 R210 070(A) R90 070(B) 
 
The “newly” disclosed taxable income in isolation, will give rise to an income tax 
liability of R 90 070 in the year of assessment. But this is only half the story. The 
progressive nature of the South African tax tables means that the applicant will 
not just be required to pay an amount of tax equivalent to A plus B. The taxable 
income will first have to be aggregated, before determining overall tax liability, 
resulting in the increased income being taxable at the applicable marginal rate.121 
                                                 
119 Including receipts and accruals earned in relation to offshore trust property after 28 February 2002, 
deemed in terms of s 4(1) of the Amnesty Act to be property of the applicant. 
120 Individual 2004/5 tax scales for persons younger than 65 years of age 
121 And possibly even pushing a lower income earning taxpayer into a higher marginal rate  
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Illustration 2 – The affect of progressive taxation: 
 
Onshore taxable income R600 000 
Offshore taxable income R300 000 
Total taxable income R900 000 
Total tax payable R330 070 
 
In the first example, an aggregate of A and B amounted to an already increased 
total liability of R300 140 and yet, because of progressive taxation, the applicant 
is required to pay R330 070. A further increase of R 29 930! 
 
It is also noteworthy, that because Amnesty was inter alia122 conditional upon the 
punctual submission of the applicant’s 2002/3 tax return,123 and this had to include 
a complete disclosure of worldwide receipts and accruals for that tax year. The 
exchange control levy was calculated with reference to the value of unauthorised 
assets held on 28 February 2003, which included gains of an income and capital 
nature earned during the 2002/3 year of assessment.124 An applicant with a 
marginal rate of tax of 40%, who chose not to repatriate foreign holdings, and pay 
a 10% levy for the right so to do,125 would therefore pay an effective rate of 50% 
on the portion of the declared foreign assets that comprised taxable income during 
the 2002/3 tax year – Not so cheap after all! 
 
 
                                                 
122 Non levy payment, or if the funds were derived from “unlawful activities” would also vitiate approval. 
123 s 20(1) of the Amnesty Act 
124 ss 11 and 12 of the Amnesty Act. 
125 Payable on amounts held in contravention of exchange controls after deducting the unutilised portion of 
the applicant’s foreign investment allowance. 
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4.3.2 Hidden Cost 2 – Increased capital gains tax exposure 
 
4.3.2.1 Redemption to fund levy may be a CGT disposal 
 
Together residence based taxation and CGT, conspire to tax disposals that result 
in taxable capital gains made on amnesty holdings after 28 February 2002. 
Redemption of an asset to pay a levy, might lead to a CGT disposal.126 (Unlike the 
tax levy which could be paid from local reserves, the exchange control levy was 
compulsorily payable from the foreign holding).127 
 
4.3.2.2 Limitation of base cost 
 
“For purposes of the Eighth Schedule to the Income Tax Act, 1962, the base cost 
of any foreign asset in respect of which approval for amnesty was granted [may] 
not exceed the sum of the value in foreign currency of that foreign asset on 28 
February 2003 as disclosed for purposes of the determination of the exchange 
control amnesty levy and any expenditure allowable in terms of paragraph 20 of 
the Eighth Schedule to the Income Tax Act, 1962, as is incurred after that date128” 
 
On 28 February 2003, Global equity markets were reeling after the March 2000 
Dot-Com stock market crash, and were still struggling to recover from the 
devastation of the September 11 terror attacks. Portfolios with any degree of 
market related exposure, including traditional savings vehicles were depressed in 
foreign currency terms. Consider this- an applicant making a disposal of a 
sanitised asset after 28 February 2003, might be doing so at a loss when compared 
to the original cost of the asset, and yet be taxed on a capital gain determined with 
reference to the statutory CGT valuation imposed by the Amnesty Act. 
                                                 
126 Unless raised from an asset excluded from the definition of a “disposal” 
127 s 13 of the Amnesty Act 
128 s 28(2) of the Amnesty Act 
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4.3.2.3 Disposals in foreign currency 
  
Paragraph 43 of the Eighth Schedule regulates the calculation of capital gains and 
losses arising out of the acquisition and disposal of assets in a foreign currency. 
Fieta Slendebroek129explains how the prevailing CGT regime can lead to the 
inequitable tax treatment of SA tax residents. The learned tax practitioner argues:  
 
a) Paragraph 43(4) of the Act determines that in the case of foreign equity 
instruments, and in the case of assets where the gain is derived or deemed in 
terms of Section 9(2) to be from a South African source, both the proceeds 
and expenditure of those assets will have to be converted into ZAR for tax 
purposes at the average rate of exchange prevailing in the relevant years; 
 
b) Section 9(2) deems a gain made by a resident from the disposal of an asset 
(other than immovable property),which is not attributable to a permanent 
establishment of the resident outside South Africa130, to be from a South 
African source; 
 
Accordingly, the disposal of foreign shareholding by a resident is deemed to be 
from an SA source, and both the base cost and the proceeds would have to be 
converted into ZAR in order to compute the capital gain/loss. Now assume an 
amnesty applicant owns 15% shares in a Tanzanian Company,131 having a base 
cost of $1 million (when the USD exchange rate was R8). Assume further that the  
                                                 
129 Slendebroek  
130 If the income is attributable to a permanent establishment outside SA, the taxable income is determined in 
the currency of the jurisdiction where the permanent establishment is situated. 
131 An example used by Mrs Slendebroek has been modified to include amnesty applicants; 
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shares are sold for $ 1million at a time when the applicable exchange rate is R9. 
Although no commercial gain has been realised in USD, for SA tax purposes, the 
proceeds have to be converted back into ZAR, resulting in a gain of R1 million.  
 
The learned practitioner explains further how Section 6quat of the Act, enables a 
rebate to be claimed only when foreign taxes are paid on income from a foreign 
source. Since Tanzania taxes the sale of shares at a rate of 20%, and no tax rebate 
may be claimed by the resident who has sold the shares because Section 9(2) 
deems the proceeds to be from a South African source, our diligent resident 
taxpayer might end up paying tax twice.  
 
This is inequitable, especially if the resident was an amnesty applicant who 
actually paid a purchase price for the shares greater than $1 million, but who, 
notwithstanding an earlier date of purchase, is obliged to use a base cost 
determined in accordance with the statutory valuation discussed earlier.  
 
4.3.3 Hidden Cost Number 3 – Estate duty and CGT on death 
 
Section 2(1) of the Estate Duty Act132 provides: 
 
“Estate duty shall be charged upon the dutiable amount of the estate calculated in 
accordance with the provisions of this Act and shall be levied at the rate set out in 
the First Schedule.” 
 
Section 3(1) of the same Act provides: 
 
“For the purposes of this Act the estate of any person shall consist of all property 
of that person as at the date of his death and of all property which in accordance 
with this Act is deemed to be property of that person at that date. 
                                                 
132 Act No 45 of 1955; 
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Foreign assets that qualify for exemptions from “property” for the purposes of the 
Act are owned by persons that are not ordinarily resident in the Republic. Foreign 
assets owned by deceased amnesty applicants who were ordinarily resident in SA 
at the time of death, will have to be brought into account for estate duty purposes. 
In addition for CGT purposes:  
 
“A deceased person, subject to certain exemptions, is treated as having disposed 
of his or her assets, [to] his or her deceased estate for proceeds equal to the 
market value of those assets at the date of that person's death.”133 
 
CGT may be paid by an heir over three years if this exceeds 50% of the 
inheritance,134 but CGT and estate duty, are charges that can seriously denude 
provision for heirs.  
 
Newly revealed “amnesty assets” will increase these potential estate liabilities. 
Existing estate plans may be seriously disrupted, especially where there is 
insufficient liquidity to meet these contingencies. Assets may have to be 
liquidated by the executor at a commercially inopportune time, causing prejudice 
to provision made by the deceased for dependants.  
 
Life Assurance remains a cost effective way to pre-fund estate duty and CGT 
payable on death.135 Affected amnesty applicants may be unable to afford the 
higher premiums required to fund this increased provision, or worse still, be 
unable to secure the life cover they require because of medical loadings or lack of 
insurability. Older amnesty applicants will be hardest hit. 
                                                 
133 para 40 of the Eighth Schedule to the Act; 
134 para 41 of the Eighth Schedule; 
135 Note: life insurance proceeds payable on death, unless forming part of a recognised exemption, are 
“deemed property” in the estate of the deceased life assured. 
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CHAPTER 5 – The death of secrecy 
 
5.1 The secrecy provision of the Income Tax Act 
 
Generally, a taxpayer’ right to secrecy stems from Section 4 of the Act: 
 
“[The] Commissioner …..shall preserve and aid in preserving secrecy with regard 
to all matters that may come to his …knowledge in the performance of his or her 
duties ……, and shall not communicate any such matter to any person whatsoever 
other than the taxpayer concerned …. nor suffer or permit any such person to have 
access to any records in the possession or custody of the Commissioner except in 
the performance of his duties under this Act or by order of a competent court.” 
 
This is a fundamental principle of tax law, and consistent with the constitutional 
right to privacy.136 
 
In Union Government v Shiu,137 Rumpff J submitted that the secrecy provision: 
  
   “encourages full disclosure and obtains and retains the confidence of persons 
supplying necessary information” 
 
Secrecy also facilitates increased disclosure to the fiscus where revelation of 
sensitive information could lead to embarrassment or conflict with business 
associates, creditors and competitors. 
 
5.2 Bank Secrecy  
 
The principles of English Law, as expounded in Tournier v National Provincial 
and Union Bank of England, 138 generally govern bank secrecy law in South 
Africa139. The court held that when a bank contracts with a client to open an  
                                                 
136 s 14 of the Constitution 
137 1955 (1) SA 298 (T) at 300, 20 SATC 28 at 30 
138 [1924] 1 KB 461 as cited by (2001) 13 SAMLJ 580 at 588 supra 
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account it will, subject to certain limitations,140 usually be bound by the contract to 
maintain the confidentiality of client information, alternatively, it will be so 
bound by the “tacit consensus”141 of the contracting parties to do so. 
 
The Promotion of Access to Information Act142 creates the right of access to 
information required for the protection or exercise of any legal rights. The 
existence of a bank’s common law duty of secrecy is statutorily recognised, albeit 
in the form of an exception, by Section 64(1) of that Act, which obliges a bank to 
refuse to disclose information that might cause commercial harm to a customer. 
 
5.3 Secrecy and Amnesty 
 
Statutory dilutions of the rights of fiscal and banking secrecy, and especially the 
Financial Intelligence Centre Act, increased the likelihood of the detection of 
unauthorised foreign holdings, possible prosecution and financial ruin. This must 
have contributed to the decision by many to apply for amnesty; 
 
The Amnesty Act contained further statutory dilutions of fiscal secrecy and 
required the applicant to make substantial disclosures. Commercial associates of 
the applicant, acting as investors and/or facilitators, may have been less willing or 
have disagreed with the decision to apply for amnesty. An application might 
contain information incriminating the associate, placing a prospective applicant in 
an extremely invidious position. 
                                                                                                                                     
139 See Densam (Pty)Ltd v Cywilnat (Pty)Ltd 1991(1) SA 100(A)  
140 (2001)13SAMLJ 601 at 602 cites: under compulsion of law; if there is a public duty to disclose; it was in 
the interests of the bank to do so; the customer expressly or impliedly gave consent for disclosure; 
141 (2001)13SAMLJ 580 at 588 supra 
142 Act 2 of 2000 
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5.4 Statutory erosions of banking and fiscal secrecy 
 
5.4.1 Specific dilutions 
 
The legislature has steadily enacted statutory provisions to dilute the taxpayer’s 
right to financial and fiscal secrecy. This attack on financial secrecy gained 
momentum in the years immediately preceding Amnesty. Examples include: 
 
a) The statutory provisos contained in Section 4 of the Act; 
  
b) Section 81(2) of the Insolvency Act143 which permits disclosure by SARS to 
the trustee of an insolvent estate;  
 
c) Section 73 of the Prevention of Organised Crime Act144 which allows 
disclosure by SARS to the prosecutorial authorities;  
 
d) Section 108(5) of the Act145 which is of specific concern to Amnesty 
applicants because, it authorises disclosure by SARS to a foreign jurisdiction 
for the purposes of determining immunity in terms of a double taxation 
agreement. 
 
e) It remains to be seen whether Sections 74 and 74A of the Act, which allows 
the Commissioner to request anything required from the taxpayer or any 
other person, extends to a Bank or not because it “does not explicitly 
authorise and compel banks to disclose information about their customers.”146  
                                                 
143 Act 24 of 1936 
144 Act 121 of 1998 
145 See also the notes in Juta’s Income Tax RS 9, 2004 at 4-4; 
146 see (2001) 13 SAMLJ 601 at 611 
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5.4.2 The Financial Intelligence Act 38 of 2001 (FICA) 
 
Perhaps the most draconian of all the statutory erosions of financial secrecy can 
be found in the provisions of FICA. 
 
Section 36(1) of that Act imposes an obligation on SARS to disclose and report 
relevant information and transactions to the Financial Intelligence Centre. 
 
Section 29 of the Act imposes on so called “Accountable Institutions” obligations 
to report suspicious and/or unusual transactions, including transactions deemed to 
be so because of inter alia the nature of the transaction, or because a statutory 
presumptive threshold has been passed.147  
 
Several foreign jurisdictions statutorily entrench a banker’s general duty of 
confidentiality and secrecy.148 Taxpayers with undisclosed holdings often 
carefully selected foreign banks because of their record of secrecy, and felt secure 
that they would escape detection. However, FICA bred a new fear that a future 
repatriation, required perhaps to maintain post retirement standards of living, 
might trigger a reporting obligation. Many applied for Amnesty to alleviate the 
emotional stress of this uncertainty.  
 
The following extract from the Explanatory Memorandum on the second 
reporting exemption in terms of FICA149 gives a sense of the hostility of the 
authorities to non applicants: 
                                                 
147 Cash transactions above regulated minimums and international financial activity is specifically identified; 
148 (2001) 13 SAMLJ 601 at 601 
149 The FICA explanatory memorandum 
 47
 
 
“The full force of the law remains applicable to any undisclosed funds that should 
have been disclosed under the amnesty process. Accordingly, where an applicant 
sought and received advice, but failed to file an amnesty application, or where an 
applicant did not seek amnesty advice and did not file an amnesty application, 
[advisors] must report any proposed transactions to the Centre under section 29 of 
the FIC Act150” 
 
5.4.3 The Amnesty Act contains further dilutions 
 
SARB generally cannot gain access to taxpayer information from SARS due to the 
legislative secrecy provisions contained in various tax Acts. SARS’s ability to 
obtain access to records from SARB is similarly limited due to the legislative 
secrecy provisions contained in its governing Act”151. 
 
Section 24(3) of the Amnesty Act expressly extends the secrecy provisions of the 
Act to members of the Amnesty Unit, but the Amnesty Act itself,152 contains a 
further dilution of the taxpayer’s right to secrecy.  A new proviso has been 
inserted into the Income Tax Act153 that permits the Commissioner to make 
disclosures to SARB, of information that may be required to exercise any power 
or perform any function or duty in terms of Exchange Control Regulations.154 
 
“Enforcing Exchange Control and the taxation of foreign income presents unique 
difficulties. Officials need to overcome information barriers posed by foreign legal 
restrictions. It is accordingly essential that extra measures be taken in order to 
ensure an enhanced flow of information to overcome these difficulties”155 
 
 
Multi-jurisdictional considerations undoubtedly demanded that information be 
exchanged between SARS and SARB, in order to facilitate the operation and  
                                                 
150 The FICA Explanatory Memorandum at 5 
151 The Amnesty Explanatory Memorandum 41 
152 s 34 
153 s 4(c)iii 
154 issued under s 9 of the Currency and Exchanges Act 9 of 1933 
155 The Amnesty Explanatory Memorandum 41 
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enforcement of the amnesty legislation, but the scope of the exemption is too 
wide, and will enable information to be shared beyond the purpose for which the 
exemption was created. The uses that this information can be put to, in a hostile, 
technologically assisted environment of improved enforcement, is worrying. A 
balance must be struck between the interests of the state, and those of the 
taxpayer, and it is hoped that our courts will apply a restrictive interpretation of 
the secrecy dilution provisions of the Amnesty Act, should the need arise.  
 
5.3.4 Amnesty application to contain detailed disclosures 
 
Amnesty applicants were obliged to make detailed disclosures in order to 
successfully apply for domestic tax relief including: 
 
a) A statement of foreign assets and liabilities as at 28 February 2002, reflected 
at both historic cost and estimated market value in the foreign currency of the 
country in which that foreign asset was situated or liability was incurred;156 
 
b) A detailed description of the asset and its location including foreign bank 
account numbers, if applicable;  
 
c) The founding document of the offshore trust as at 28 February 2003 where an 
application was made in terms of the deeming provision in Section 4;157 
 
d) A foreign balance sheet as at 28 February 2003 for exchange control amnesty 
purposes; 
                                                 
156 s7 of the Amnesty Act 
157 s 4(4) of the Amnesty Act 
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Detailed disclosures are a further hidden cost of Amnesty and a price to be paid to 
regularise previous contraventions. It is likely, that many potential applicants did 
not trust the motives of a revenue collection agency with a less than perfect record 
of human rights advancement, and were discouraged from applying because of the 
nature of disclosures required, and the embarrassing position in which they might 
find themselves with non-applicants, incriminated by entries indelibly recorded in 
founding documentation. 
 
CHAPTER 6 – Selected tax planning considerations. 
 
The following post amnesty planning considerations are relevant to natural person 
applicants, and will be examined in the context of the hidden costs of amnesty 
highlighted earlier. 
 
6.1 The advantages of retaining the offshore trust 
 
Section 4 Amnesty applicants are in a uniquely privileged position because: 
 
6.1.1 Offshore capital allowance remains in trust 
 
Generally, the foreign investment allowance is not available to trusts. Besides 
exchange control considerations, resident taxpayers, wishing to transfer their 
allowance to an offshore trust for deceased estate planning purposes, would be 
discouraged from doing so because of donations tax, and because of the income 
attribution and anti-avoidance provisions discussed earlier. 
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As outlined previously, a 2% domestic tax levy was payable by the applicant to 
cure the non disclosure of the donation for tax purposes. If the asset donated had 
been shifted from domestic tax non disclosures, the levy would have been payable 
only once. Significantly, the domestic tax levy, unlike the exchange control 
levy,158could be paid from domestic resources. It was therefore possible to retain 
the foreign holding intact without having to redeem a portion thereof to pay the 
domestic tax levy. 
 
Although a Section 4 applicant becomes accountable for receipts and accruals 
made by the offshore trust, from 1 March 2002 until disposal:  
 
a)  The income and capital attribution rules supra do not apply in respect of any 
income or capital gains made by the trust before 1 March 2002159; and 
 
b) The anti avoidance provisions of the Act have been suspended;160and the 
founder may deal freely with the trust property,161 including the pursuit of tax 
saving initiatives for the trust, in order to reduce personal income tax; and 
 
c) The successful applicant has retained the long term advantages of housing the 
now increased foreign investment allowance in the offshore trust.  
 
 
 
                                                 
158 which could only be paid from abroad 
159 S 7(a) of the Regulations; 
160 s 4(3)(b) of the Amnesty Act; 
161 Regulation 4(b) 
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6.1.2 Estate and post death tax planning advantages are maintained. 
 
Although the income tax advantages of retaining the foreign holding in the 
offshore trust during the donor’s lifetime might have been nullified by the Section 
4 election, this is not true insofar as the estate planning and post death tax 
advantages of retaining the offshore trust is concerned. The election by the 
applicant terminates at death.162 From this date the taxpayer is deemed to have 
disposed of the foreign asset for a consideration equal to its market value on the 
date of disposal,163 giving rise to CGT accountability for the deceased estate.164 
 
From the date of death and this disposal, and the termination of the deeming 
provision, the nexus between the non resident discretionary trust and the South 
African Income Tax and Estate Duty Acts, is for the moment broken. This has 
two major advantages: 
 
a) No estate duty is payable on the death of the donor or discretionary 
beneficiaries of the offshore trust; and 
 
b) Income received by or accruing to the trust is not taxable in South Africa;165 
 
Distributions made by the offshore trust to a resident South African beneficiary 
after the death of the founder/applicant, will give rise to CGT accountability for  
 
                                                 
162s 4(c)(ii) of Regulations issued ito s.30 of the Amnesty Act; 
163 s 4(3)(b) of the Amnesty Act 
164   The capital gain will be represented by the difference between the market value of the deemed assets on 
1 March 2002 (and any subsequent expenditure incurred by that discretionary trust in respect of that 
foreign asset), and the market value of the deemed assets on the date of disposal; 
165 Unless the provisions of s.25B (2A) of the Act are applicable. (see earlier at 2.4) 
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that beneficiary.166 A distribution made to a non – resident beneficiary will have 
no South African tax consequence. This has considerable advantages for 
applicants with loved ones residing abroad.167The retention of the offshore trust 
has re-opened the door for beneficiaries to explore tax arbitrages, after the death 
of the donor.  
 
6.2 Tax effective investment selection 
 
Investec Trust argues in favour of capital growth investments because: 
 
“Income and capital gains are….. taxed at different rates in SA, and the offshore 
trustees, by identifying suitable investment products, can…seek to ensure that 
[returns] are in the form of capital gains. [They can also] defer receipt of income 
indefinitely or time receipt of income to meet the beneficiaries’ requirements.168” 
 
While capital is taxed more favourably than income in South Africa, and capital 
growth products offer the prospect of a return less eroded by income tax, 
appropriate investment advice must extend to the selection of an underlying asset 
that best suits the investor’s requirements. Factors such as appetite for risk, 
liquidity, capital preservation, and future provision, must also be evaluated. An 
investment should not be pursued because of its tax benefits alone.   
 
Section 4 applicants would also be well advised to restrict their analysis to 
products that offer tax savings to both the trust and the natural persons. In terms  
 
                                                 
166 ibid 56 
167 Investec 1 
168 Ibid 173 
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of the election, receipts and accruals from the trust property will have to be 
accounted for in the donor’s personal income tax return, and certain constructions 
are not tax effective if pursued in the name of a trust169  
 
6.2.1 Insurance wrappers. 
 
“Preferential tax treatment is afforded to insurance policies to encourage long-
term savings.”170  
 
Substantial amnesty monies will be/are housed in traditional savings vehicles 
offered by long term insurers. An examination of other investment products such 
as roll-up funds, which seek to explore tax efficiencies by deferring the realisation 
of gains to maturity,171 will need to stand over to another day. For the moment at 
least, because of their popularity, it is necessary to examine the tax advantages of 
long term insurance policies in the context of the hidden tax costs of amnesty 
identified earlier. 
 
6.2.1.1 The four fund approach 
 
The foundation for tax savings available via these constructions can be found in 
Section 29A of the Income Tax Act. In terms hereof, South African long term 
insurers are required to establish four separate funds in which funds are held:172 
                                                 
169 eg a voluntary term certain annuity does not qualify for a capital exemption ito s. 10(1)(a) of the Act.  
170 Explanatory Memorandum on the Taxation Laws Amendment Bill, 2001 at 87 (Silke at Chapter 24-96)        
171 Many of these products are yet to be tested in our courts – many of these structures function using 
discounts and premiums, and “s 24J related problems” cannot be disregarded. It has become common for 
financial institutions to insert clauses in their investment documentation permitting maturity values to be 
adjusted should their understanding of the tax environment at the time of issuing the contract be flawed. 
This clause too is offensive, and may yet itself be subject to consumer protection evaluation.  
172 s 29A(4) of the Income Tax Act 
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1)  An untaxed policyholder fund for retirement and benefit funds, tax exempt 
funds and annuity contracts; 
 
2) An individual policyholder fund for non company owned policies; 
 
3)  A company policyholder fund for policies owned by a company; and 
 
4) A corporate fund for policies not qualifying for the three funds referred to 
above, and for business conducted outside the Republic; 
 
“Look through rules”173are used to determine the fund into which a policyholder’s 
investment is to be placed. Where the owner of a policy is a trust, AND all the 
beneficiaries of such trust are natural persons, the policy will form part of the 
individual policyholder fund174just like a policy taken out by a natural person.  
 
Each fund is taxed in the hands of the long term insurer as if it were a separate 
taxpayer, each applying different regulated principles of taxation.175 This is 
commonly referred to as “the four fund approach” of taxation. The rate of taxation 
of the individual policyholder fund is 30%.176 Disposals by the individual 
policyholder fund that give rise to taxable capital gains, are therefore taxed at an 
effective rate of 7.5%177 in the hands of the insurer.  
 
 
 
                                                 
173 Silke at 17.14A- Insurance — long-term: new regime 
174 s 29A(5)(a) of the Income Tax Act; 
175 s 29A(10) 
      176 Para 2(f) of Schedule 1 of the Amnesty Act fixes the rate for individual policyholder funds at 30% 
177An individual inclusion rate of 25% of the taxable capital gain is taxed at the flat rate of   30%;   
 55
 
 
An insurer is obliged to transfer an investment to the applicable fund178 when it 
becomes aware of a change of policy ownership, or of any change affecting the 
status of the owner of a policy. The addition of a trust beneficiary that is not a 
natural person, for example, will therefore result in the policy being transferred to 
the company policyholder fund, and being subjected to a higher rate of taxation. 
 
6.2.1.2 Proceeds of long term insurance policies not taxable 
 
Generally, long term insurance policy proceeds, unless part of a profit making 
scheme, are of a capital nature,179 and may be disregarded by qualifying 
taxpayers180 for CGT purposes, if the policy is a “policy” as defined in Section 
29A of the Income Tax Act.181  
 
Section 29A defines a “policy” as a long-term policy taken out in terms of the 
Long Term Insurance Act.182 Read with related regulation this means: 
 
a) The policy must have been issued by a resident South African insurer or a 
branch office of that insurer; and  
 
b) The policy must have been owned by the initial policyholder for five years; 
 
Unfortunately, the CGT exemption is not available to residents who own long-
term policies issued by foreign insurers. The Explanatory Memorandum on the 
Taxation Laws Amendment Bill, 2001183 explains: 
                                                 
178 s 29A(6) 
     179  Silke  at 3.32 
180 There are other requirements eg the policy may not be a second hand policy, the proceeds must be payable 
to the original policyholder, or his spouse or in terms of an order of court. 
   181 Para 55(2) of the Eighth schedule; see also Silke  at  24-.96; 
182 Act 52 of 1998 
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“Although the build-up in these [foreign] policies is not subject to income tax in 
the Republic they will be subject to [capital gains tax] on disposal by applying the 
normal principles for determining a capital gain or capital loss on disposal.” 
 
Foreign policy proceeds paid to a resident will therefore amount to a CGT 
disposal, even though the underlying investment may have been subjected to 
taxation in another jurisdiction in the hands of the foreign insurer. Amnesty 
applicants with foreign insurance policies, or those contemplating investing with a 
foreign insurer, should evaluate these tax consequences in the context of their 
overall investment requirements.  
 
6.2.1.3 Reducing the tax cost of amnesty with a “tax wrapper.” 
 
Long term insurance policies184 issued by South African insurers or their foreign 
branch offices, can, and do, materially reduce the hidden income tax cost of 
amnesty for natural persons, including Section 4 applicants. The investment 
platform operates to “ring fence” tax liability in a “wrapper,” because investment 
returns are taxed without reference to the marginal rate of the policyholder. The 
flat taxation rate of 30%, results in an immediate tax saving of 25%, for investor’s 
with a 40% marginal rate of tax,185 because, neither the investment income, nor 
the policy proceeds, are included in the gross income of the applicant.  
 
Tax wrappers can also play a meaningful role in keeping a retired186 investor’s 
marginal rate of tax down. Consider the following illustrations; 
                                                                                                                                     
183 At 87 as cited by Silke at  24-.96 
184 usually structured as endowments or ‘sinking funds’ 
185 10% of 40% 
186 This also applies to taxpayers who, before retirement, have a marginal rate of tax of less than 40%.  
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a) If income in the policy was generated via an investment that did not offer the 
“insulation” of the wrapper, and was instead earned in the investor’s own 
name, this might have the effect of pushing up the marginal rate of tax 
applicable to supplementary investment income;  
 
b) The relinquishment of an asset which gives rise to a CGT disposal is taxed 
with reference to the disposer’s marginal rate – for example- a tax rate of 30% 
will mean that taxable capital gains made by the retired investor will be taxed 
at an effective rate of 7.5%, whereas a tax rate of 40% will result in that same 
capital gain being taxed at an effective rate of 10% - quite a difference, 
especially when the net capital gain made is required to generate 
supplementary retirement income – The “tax wrapper” has kept the disposer’s 
overall rate of tax down, and has therefore indirectly reduced the taxability of 
the disposal of a capital asset outside the wrapper; 
 
c) The proceeds of domestic long term insurance policies are not taxable in the 
hands of the owner. Retired investors should be encouraged to leave matured 
policies with the insurer, and part fund their living expenses via capital 
withdrawals made out of the policy in accordance with the insurer’s “bonus 
rate.” The after tax nature of these withdrawals means that the retiree’s overall 
tax rate on other retirement income will be lower. 
 
If the underlying investment contained within the “wrapper,” is purely of a capital 
nature, no tax will be payable on any income for there is none, and wealth erosion 
will limited to the 7.5% CGT charge – much lower than the investor’s probable 
effective CGT rate of 10%, or even 20% if the case of a trust!   
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Investec notes that capital growth investments are taxed more favourably than 
income generating investments. Such investments are generally more tax 
effective, but with minor exceptions,187 do not contain suitable underlying capital 
guarantees for conservative investors. Amnesty investors must not forget their 
financial objectives, and refrain from pursuing foreign tax wrappers solely 
because of their perceived tax advantages. 
 
6.2.2 Reducing the tax cost of amnesty with retirement annuities 
 
Taxpayers may, subject to certain exceptions, in order to determine their taxable 
income, deduct contributions to a retirement annuity fund (“RAF”) up to a 
maximum of 15 per cent188 of their non-retirement funding income.189 Certain 
contributions to a RAF may not be deducted,190however, 
 
“[these] provisions [shall] apply for the purpose of determining the taxpayer’s total 
taxable income whether derived from the carrying on of any trade or otherwise;191 
 
While this means that taxable capital gains must be excluded from the calculation 
to determine the 15% allowable deduction, (because capital gains are part of 
taxable income and not income), 192it is clear that all investment income, both 
domestic and foreign, can be brought into account for purposes of the calculation. 
This offers some unique advantages for natural persons with legitimate foreign 
holdings, including successful amnesty applicants because: 
 
                                                 
187 For example, zero-cost collars with underlying capital guarantees. 
188 s 11(m) of the Income Tax Act; 
189 Generally income not taken into account for the purposes of a pension or provident fund; 
190 eg restrictions on what constitutes “non retirement funding income” apply. 
191 s 11(m)(vi) 
192 1999 JUTA'S INCOME TAX - 11(m)-2 
 59
 
a) Foreign interest income is prejudicially taxed, and only R1000 is exempt from 
gross income.193 RAF contributions enable a taxpayer to save tax at the highest 
applicable marginal rate because the amount contributed to the RAF will 
directly reduce taxable income at that rate; 
 
b) The RAF contributions can be paid out of domestic resources without 
reducing the foreign holding; 
 
c) A long term insurer must invest RAF contributions in the “untaxed 
policyholder fund, creating an even more effective “tax wrapper” to further 
insulate the policyholder from tax on the increasing value of the fund; 
 
d) The RAF deduction enables taxpayers to save at their highest marginal rates 
during high earning years of employment, and to defer taxability of annuity 
income derived from the RAF, to retirement when taxable income is lower194. 
  
7. CHAPTER 7 – Conclusion 
 
7.1 The 2003 Tax Amnesty – an olive branch to tax dodgers? 
 
A former Commissioner of Inland Revenue, Trevor van Heerden, speaking at the 
South African Chamber of Business in December 1997, replied to a question 
posed about a recently completed domestic tax amnesty that had been met with 
only a muted response, as follows:  
 
 
                                                 
193 Currently, a taxpayer older than 65 years of age is not taxed on the first R22 000 of domestic interest 
income, and a taxpayer younger than 65 is exempt on the first R16000 of domestic interest income; 
194 A retirement annuity must be matured between the taxpayer’s 55th and 70th birthdays; 
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“It has always been our view that a tax amnesty is not the way. Those who practise 
tax-dodging do not and will not expose themselves to the future in return for 
forgiveness of the unknown [if] they can live with their consciences. The deterrent 
to tax-dodging is the probability of being caught and the consequential 
penalties”195. 
 
Much has happened in our fledgling democracy since this threatening utterance. A 
spirit of forgiveness and reconciliation took hold. Following the National Unity 
and Reconciliation Act,196 the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (hereinafter 
“the TRC”) was mandated to examine human rights abuses perpetuated during the 
dark days of apartheid. The TRC Amnesty Committee was charged with 
evaluating amnesty applications for politically motivated criminal activity. 
 
Perhaps this same spirit of conciliation persuaded Revenue to alter its stance on 
an amnesty to residents with “grey money” shifted abroad with political 
motivations during the apartheid years. Perhaps the Honourable Minister of 
Finance, Trevor Manuel MP, had to be “dragged kicking and screaming into 
offering the amnesty.”197 It is more likely, that the economic advantages of 
broadening the tax base and raising easy cash from levy payments, did not escape 
the eagle eye of the tax legislator either.  
 
An amnesty for political crime and a tax amnesty are surely very different. In the 
2004 South African Law Journal198, Antje Pedain published a study of the 
decisions of the TRC Amnesty Committee, entitled - Was Amnesty a Lottery?  
                                                 
195 THE TAXPAYER January 1998 - Volume 47 No 1 at 1.1 
196 Act 34 of 1995 
197 A press comment of unknown citation observed at the time of the announcement of the amnesty. 
198 2004 SALJ 785 
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The report identifies the “divergent success rates for applicants from different 
perpetuator groups, [and verified that] the spectre of bias [had unfortunately 
raised] its head again”199 
 
The TRC Amnesty also contained pre–qualification criteria, and:  
 
“provided the applicant did not act out of personal malice, ill will or spite directed 
against the victim or solely for personal gain, the Committee would then consider 
his conduct in the light of further criteria.” 
 
In the case of the 2003 Tax and Exchange Control Amnesty, the applicant’s 
“crime” arguably found its root in human materialism, and the desire to preserve 
wealth for selfish and familial reasons. 
 
The Tax Amnesty offered South African taxpayers the choice of whether to come 
clean or not. The window period for application was, however, far too short – It 
was already three months into the, twice delayed, and once extended amnesty, 
that Circular D405 was issued by SARB to provide relief for immigrants, heirs 
and limited other persons. Would it perhaps not have been more conciliatory to 
extend the period of the window, with later applications carrying an increasing 
levy on a sliding scale? How many applicants lost to the process, were even aware 
of the Amnesty? How many were not afforded an opportunity to have their 
questions answered, and their fears and suspicions allayed? The Amnesty Unit 
readily confirms that they continued to receive a deluge of amnesty applications 
months after the expiry of the Amnesty deadline,200 which they may not process. 
                                                 
199 2004SALJ 785 at 828 
200 Discussions held between the author and Advocate Mahlangu SC, Chairman of the Amnesty Unit. 
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7.2 The Tax Man Cometh!201 
 
Globally, the OECD202 has made great strides in the sphere of tax compliance, and 
the sharing of information between revenue collection agencies will be a major 
money spinner for a technologically much improved SARS.  
 
The “once sacrosanct”203 secrecy provisions of the Act have been steadily eroded, 
and financial institutions, facing draconian criminal sanction and fines sounding 
in billions, are bound by “whistle blowing legislation” such as FICA to report 
deemed suspicious and unusual transactions. The names of convicted tax 
offenders are posted on public bulletin boards, and powers of search and seizure 
have been statutorily expanded to enable George Orwell-type revenue inspectors 
to make short notice surprise visits on their innocent until proven guilty prey.  
 
History records that Alfonso Capone, the great American crime boss, was finally 
incarcerated in a maximum security penitentiary by District Attorney Elliot Ness, 
not on charges of murder or bank-robbery, but for tax evasion. South Africa’s 
criminal justice system also draws no distinction between the place of 
incarceration for murderous bandits, and convicted tax evaders.  
 
7.4 The need to plan ahead 
 
South African taxpayers who wisely applied for amnesty, can be assured that the 
tax man not only cometh – he has been, and now knows exactly what he is  
                                                 
201 The title of an editorial dealing with increased revenue collection enforcement which appeared in THE 
TAXPAYER January 1998 - Volume 47 No 1 
202 Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development 
203 From notes taken at the Divaris workshop 
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looking for. – He has a sworn declaration to refer to when assessing tax returns 
until death, and even thereafter!  
 
It is submitted that the Amnesty WAS a golden opportunity to regularise 
contraventions of applicable tax and exchange control regulations. It WAS 
ridiculously cheap at the price, BUT ONLY IF legitimate tax planning strategies 
are employed to mitigate the ramifications of a successful application. Taxpayers 
that fail to modify their tax conduct in a post amnesty environment, and fail to 
provide for the hidden costs of amnesty adumbrated herein, may well discover 
that the Amnesty was anything but cheap, and must be prepared to have their 
wealth steadily chiselled away by residence based taxation. 
 
Perhaps then, the TRC Amnesty and the 2003 Tax Amnesty were not that 
different after all! Both are as controversial, both as “morally troublesome.”204 
Both required a full and complete disclosure by the applicant. Both were 
somewhat of a lottery! 
 
In the unlikely event that a further tax amnesty lies ahead, it will not be on as 
favourable terms. The short duration of this Amnesty bears testimony to that. 
Non-applicants that intend to remain tax residents of South Africa will have to 
tread very carefully. Such taxpayers face a terrible dilemma.  
 
No provision whatsoever exists in the Amnesty Act for late applications to be 
considered. Indeed, even an application to the High Court to condone the late  
 
                                                 
204 2004SALJ 785 at 785 
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filing of an amnesty application, even with extreme extenuation, has no basis in 
law, because the application period was statutorily defined;205 
 
Approaching the Commissioner now, albeit with contrition and remorse, may 
well be met with a hostile reception, and a straight forward question: - “Why did 
you not apply when you had the chance?” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
205 s.10(1)(a) of the Amnesty Act; 
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